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Six Days: How the 1967 War Shaped the Middle East Written by Jeremy Bowen
 Originally published in 2003 by Simon and Shuster432 pages
Six Days is a well-written account of the hour-to-hour operation of the Six Day War in June 1967 between Israel and the combined Arab states, by a former BBC Middle East correspondent, Jeremy Bowen. Given the author’s experience it is not surprising that the book is firmly grounded in the present day realities of the Israel-Palestine conflict. His thesis is that influential elements within the Israeli state and military were planning for, and actively seeking war with their Arab neighbours, and these neighbours played right into their hands with provocative propaganda and posturing. Further, the Arab states were woefully unprepared for a war, their leadership and planning was extremely negligent. Their leadership had apparently begun to believe their own propaganda.
Key to Bowen’s thesis is the theme of propaganda. Arab and Israeli propaganda served to create an image of Israel as weak, surrounded by enemies who were planning to sweep all before them into the sea. The reality of course was far different, with the Arab armies being uncoordinated, and not ready for a war; Israel conversely was extremely well prepared for war. This dichotomy was not a total surprise, the USA, USSR and UK had all been well aware that Israel was far stronger than the Arab states, and was far better prepared for a direct war. Of the Arab leaders only Jordan’s King Hussein was really aware of this, and he was unable to act on this suspicion due to a combination of sustained Israeli provocation and the fact that Egyptian propaganda had so inflamed his people that he had no real freedom of action in stopping Jordanian participation in any war with Israel. Bowen heavily pushes this point.
The completeness of the Israeli victory obscured wide divisions within their government and military. Many believed that the hawks within the state and army were deliberately pushing Israel into a war, which could well ensure that long term peace with the Arabs would be unlikely. As the war progressed, and it became clear that Israel had completely destroyed all opposition and could thus occupy large parts of Jordan, Egypt and Syria these voices of caution worried that the war would never end. The reason was that the new territories had huge numbers of Palestinian citizens, and international opinion would not allow Israel to completely evict them in the same way it had in 1948. Any occupation of these areas would therefore entail a long-term campaign. Which is exactly what has happened. Israel has had to spend massive resources governing, and guarding these territories, all the while progressively alienating the original inhabitants, creating a vicious cycle of violence that occurs to this day.
The victory while one of, if not the most, stunning campaigns of the 20th century was therefore a calculated gamble on the part of some Israelis, which has created a thirty-year insurgency. Bowen clearly highlights this cruel irony that a famously short war should result in a conflict that is still occurring nearly 40 years after its conclusion. He squarely places the blame for the current violence on the 1967 war.
Looking at the book from a technical perspective Bowen follows the events of the war closely, tracking the events as they happen in a linear timeline. This allows him to illustrate well the complete confusion that occurred on the Arab side once Israel struck, and their rapid collapse. This device also allows him to capture the attention of the reader, with a constant stream of action not unlike watching a TV news network. Of course I could be forcing this analogy due to my knowledge of the author’s background. Overall I would recommend this book to anyone who follows the current Israeli-Palestine conflict as it provides a easy to read background to the conflict.
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